Skip to content
MYRIGHTZ
vehicle

Seat Belts, And The Stop They Cannot Make

ORC 4513.263 — secondary enforcement, in the statute's own words

Email

The obligation itself is short: a driver and the occupants the section names wear an occupant restraining device, properly adjusted and fastened. What almost nobody quotes is what the same section then forbids an officer from doing about it, and what a later civil case may and may not do with it.

The stop cannot be for this alone, and neither can the look. No law enforcement officer shall cause an operator to stop for the sole purpose of determining whether a violation of division (B) has been or is being committed, or for the sole purpose of issuing a citation for one, or causing an arrest or commencing a prosecution for one. The sentence then goes further, and this is the half never quoted: no officer shall view the interior or visually inspect any automobile being operated on any street or highway for the sole purpose of determining whether such a violation has been or is being committed.
Sole purpose is doing all the work in that sentence. An independent lawful basis for a stop is untouched by the provision. Once a vehicle is stopped for something else, a belt that is not fastened is simply there to be seen, and a citation may follow. The section limits what may start a stop and what may prompt a look, not what is visible during a stop that had its own reason.
  • A violation of division (B)(1) carries a fine of thirty dollars.
  • A violation of division (B)(3) carries a fine of twenty dollars.
  • There is no jail term in the section at all, which also means the jury statute does not reach it: the right to a jury trial does not apply where the potential penalty includes no prison or jail term and the possible fine does not exceed one thousand dollars.
The civil rule cuts both ways, and people are usually told one half. Failure to wear all of the available elements of a properly adjusted occupant restraining device shall not be considered or used by the trier of fact in a tort action as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence. The same division then allows the trier of fact, on evidence admitted consistently with the rules of evidence, to determine that the failure contributed to the harm alleged and to diminish a recovery of compensatory damages representing noneconomic loss that could otherwise have been recovered. Noneconomic is the word that limits it.

“Was this stop for the seat belt, or for something else?”

Child restraint systems are a separate section with its own requirements and its own enforcement, and nothing here describes them. Commercial vehicles, certain vehicle types and municipal ordinances are each treated on their own terms. Whether a particular stop had an independent basis is a suppression question decided on a record, and a licensed Ohio attorney is who raises it.

Sources for this section (5)
  1. ORC 4513.263 — Occupant restraining devices, the secondary enforcement limit, and the civil rule
  2. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) — A traffic stop is reasonable when there is probable cause of a traffic violation
  3. ORC 2945.17 — Right to a jury trial, and the two violations it does not reach
  4. ORC 4511.81 — Child restraint systems
  5. Ohio Crim.R. 12 — Pretrial motions, including motions to suppress evidence

Legal information, not legal advice. Verified as of September 2026. Talk to a licensed Ohio attorney about your situation.

Words in this section

Terms with a legal meaning that is narrower than the everyday one. Each links to the definition and the authority behind it.

Nearest pages

Sections that share statutes or vocabulary with this one. Most questions turn out to sit across two of them.